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What Can the OECD Learn From the States?
Richard D. Pomp is the
Alva P. Loiselle Professor of
Law at the University of
Connecticut School of Law.
A few months before
the widespread
devastation unleashed by
the coronavirus
pandemic, nearly 140
countries agreed to
formulate a plan for
modernizing the income
taxation of multinational
corporations. The director of the OECD’s Centre
for Tax Policy and Administration acknowledged
that the date “may look a bit insane,” but the
alternative is the risk of trade wars based on tax
disputes. Today — in the middle of a global
economic depression — that risk looks downright
tame. The real risk is that the implosion of
economies throughout the world will lead
countries to recede to the basest and darkest of
human emotions.
Insane or not, the end of 2020 is no longer
aspirational but has now become a critical
deadline. The pandemic has made taxing
jurisdictions around the world desperate for
money if their institutions are to survive. The
OECD needs to recognize that the states
developed a better mousetrap in dealing with
cross-jurisdictional corporations. It is time their
experiences should be recognized as a model to be
emulated.
4

A. Historical Perspective

Necessity is the mother of invention, and at
the beginning of the 20th century the states were
forced to develop a better alternative to federal
transfer pricing and sourcing rules. Long before
the dramatic rise of the multinationals after World
War II, which started to expose the weaknesses in
the federal rules and in the bilateral income tax
treaties, the states had to respond to the challenge
of taxing interstate corporations.
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See Richard D. Pomp, State and Local Taxation, 9th ed. 2019, pp. 10-1
through 10-8; 10-40 through 10-79.
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To deal with this, after a few inadequate starts,
formulary apportionment emerged as the
consensus approach in the early 20th century,
building on the taxation of interstate railroads.
Some states, under the intellectual leadership of
California, started combining domestic related
entities by the mid 1930s, which eliminated the
need to police transfer prices and the shifting of
profits to domestic tax havens (such as Nevada in
the case of California). The apportionment
formula would determine how much of the tax
base a state could tax, substituting for the
primitive federal sourcing rules.
The IRS was essentially indifferent to purely
domestic interstate corporations, which typically
filed consolidated returns. Consequently,
interstate corporations posed no tax problem at
the federal level, unlike the challenges they
presented at the state level.
To be sure, there were a small number of U.S.
corporations with foreign activities as early as the
mid-19th century, such as the Singer
Manufacturing Co. — incorporated in 1851 and
often cited as the first U.S.-based multinational —
selling sewing machines first in Europe and later
in India, Australia, South Africa, and New
Zealand. By the end of the 19th century, Singer
was joined by other multinationals of the time,
including Westinghouse, General Electric,
Eastman Kodak, and Standard Oil.
B. The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Worldwide
Combined Reporting
These multinationals presented special
problems for both the IRS and the states,
especially after World War II. The IRS used the
federal transfer pricing and source rules, in the
context of international tax treaties, and many
states often piggybacked on this, accepting the
resulting federal allocation of income as their
5
starting point. But some states that were
combining domestic corporations went further,
and extended this technique to include foreign
entities, a method known as worldwide combined
reporting.
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One early exception was New York. See Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton
Limited v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
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The major advantages are obvious. Tax havens
are combined, bringing their income back into the
tax base. The need for the global intangible lowtaxed income (GILTI) regime and similar
approaches is eliminated. Tax minimization
games built around income shifting are undercut,
if not fully stopped. The manipulation of tax
treaties is eliminated.
Although a tax treaty with the United
Kingdom unsuccessfully tried to halt mandatory
worldwide combined reporting, political pressure
from the Reagan administration bullied
California and those in its fold to stop using this
approach. The lesson for the OECD (and the EU)
is that this retrenchment was political in nature
and not because of administrative obstacles
(although critics would allege otherwise).
C. Production vs. Market

6

Much of the European debate is over how to
assign the tax base between the production
country and the market country. The states have
fought this battle at least since 1957 when the
Uniform Law Commission brought us the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA). UDITPA sets forth an evenly weighted
three-factor formula, using property, payroll, and
sales. In the case of tangible personal property,
sales are attributed to the state in which the goods
are delivered or shipped. That formula thus
incorporates two production or origin factors
(property and payroll) and one market factor
(sales).
For all other sales, most notably services,
UDITPA assigns the receipts using what is known
as the costs of performance approach. In this case,
there is an all-or-nothing approach: The one state
in which the greatest costs of income-producing
activities occurs receives all the receipts. (Some
states reject this all-or-nothing approach and
utilize a proportional methodology.)
Of special interest to the OECD (and the EU)
is the dissatisfaction with the production bias
inherent in the costs of performance approach.
Instead, states have been replacing that approach
by using a market-based approach to the sales

factor (and some go even further, apportioning
income using only sales). The MTC, probably the
greatest depository of intellectual firepower in the
field, has spent two years drafting exhaustive
rules designing different approaches to marketbased sourcing depending on the type of
transaction involved.
The OECD should design its own formula,
factors, and their respective weighting, but the
MTC has done the heavy intellectual lifting. And
the MTC has special formulas for special
industries.
D. Nexus
With the fairly recent U.S. Supreme Court case
7
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., the physical presence
rule imposed under the commerce clause was
rejected in sales tax cases, similar to the
movement to eliminate the PE rule that is at the
heart of existing bilateral income tax treaties. The
experience of the states post-Wayfair is another
source that can be drawn upon. Moreover, long
before Wayfair, the states were imposing economic
nexus rules in their income taxes. The MTC
developed “factor presence” rules for nexus,
which incorporated economic nexus approaches.
Free of any commerce clause constraint, the
OECD can also draw on this experience in
designing its nexus rules.
E. Adopting Mandatory Worldwide Combined
Reporting
Without a commerce clause to deal with, the
OECD has more latitude than the American states
to adopt a worldwide combined approach. (All
the U.S. litigation over the definition of a unitary
business, a precondition under the commerce
clause to combination, would be irrelevant.) Once
again, the MTC and the states have relevant
experience to draw on. Mandatory worldwide
combined reporting, with a well-designed
apportionment formula, is a better alternative to
the OECD’s agenda. It deals better with tax
havens, transfer pricing, defining specific types of
businesses, such as digital or “consumer-facing,”
profit shifting, and the allocation of overhead. It
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See Richard D. Pomp, Report of the Hearing Officer, Multistate Tax
Compact Article IV, [UDITPA], Proposed Amendments (2013).
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138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
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nicely addresses the digital economy and
undercuts many tax minimization strategies.
F. The Combined Tax Base
One area in which the state experience will not
be useful, however, is the nature of the tax base to
be combined. Neither UDITPA nor the MTC
addresses this critical issue. International
accounting standards and the Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base could fill the
void as a starting point. I have enough friends
who are financial accountants and who, like tax
lawyers, can make anything so complicated that
the temptation is to throw up our collective hands
in frustration. Experienced draftspersons know,
however, that “the perfect is the enemy of the
good.” Persons working in good faith and with an
urgent sense of mission can arrive at something
good enough to be workable.
Helen Hecht’s contribution in this installment
summarizes the OECD’s ambitious 11 “work
streams.” The states have much to offer in
resolving the issues addressed by these work
streams. It is unnecessary for the OECD (or the
EU) to reinvent the wheel when the states already
own the original patent.
G. Administering a Worldwide Combined
Reporting
Many countries will be unable to administer a
worldwide combined reporting regime without
help. My preference would be for a
nongovernmental organization that has the
capability, expertise, and sophisticated personnel
who can climb the needed learning curve, to take
on this burden on behalf of all countries. The
OECD, the U.N., the IMF, or the World Bank
would be logical candidates. Resistance can be
expected, of course, to this new global tax and the
resulting international bureaucracy, with
conspiracy fanatics being unleashed and warning
of “black helicopters” and “world domination.”
But the real fear is not this lunacy, but rather the
dystopian world we will be moving toward if
there is not sufficient revenue to rebuild
economies and bolster democratic institutions by
the end of 2020.

1298

TAX NOTES STATE, JUNE 15, 2020
For more Tax Notes® State content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

